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I. Introduction/Thesis Statement 
 
This thesis examines the establishment of the position of Under Secretary of Defense for 
Policy, or USD(P), focusing on the factors that underpinned its establishment in 1977.  The 
Department of Defense was organizationally flawed from its creation in 1947 and as the years 
went by, executive orders and congressional legislation fundamentally altered its organizational 
relationships.1
In determining the most significant causes that contributed to the creation of the 
OUSD(P), four central factors emerge: 
 To understand why the USD(P) was created, this thesis analyzes the most 
influential factors which ultimately shaped the creation of the first USD(P) position and how the 
Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, or OUSD(P), was later organized in 
response to national security requirements. 
First, President Jimmy Carter’s governmental reorganization project for the executive 
departments, coupled with concurrent Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) reorganizational 
efforts, helped shaped the creation of the first USD(P). Each study produced its own conclusions 
carefully detailing the areas in which a comprehensive review would probe existing Department 
of Defense (DoD) functions and compatibilities. Secretary of Defense Harold Brown was already 
underway with his own reorganizational effort at the time of President Carter’s request, thus 
providing a dual emphasis towards effectively streamlining the DoD through improved resource 
management, reorganized management structure, and a revamping of the national military 
command structure. President Carter’s request ultimately complemented Secretary Brown’s 
ongoing reorganization efforts.  
                                                             
1 Roger R. Trask and Alfred Goldberg, The Department of Defense 1947-1997: Organization and Leaders 
(Washington, DC: Historical Office of the Office of the Secretary of Defense, 1997), pg. v. [preface] 
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Second, steps were taken to reduce the Secretary of Defense’s (SECDEF) span of 
control. This theme is recurrent throughout many of Secretary Brown’s own initiatives to transfer 
functions that no longer needed to be performed at his level. The fragmentation of executive 
authority among independent OSD offices, several of which had similar functions and 
responsibilities, resulted in excessive and time consuming coordination, often requiring far too 
many decisions to that went to the SECDEF of Deputy Secretary of Defense (DEPSECDEF) for 
resolution.2
Third, DoD-based organizational studies, highlighting recurrent challenges to effective 
management, focused on the elimination of redundant, overlapping, and unnecessary roles. Much 
attention focused on the reorganization of OSD, with emphasis on consolidating related 
functions, eliminating unnecessary or marginal functions, and transferring to lower echelons 
those functions which were primarily operational in nature. Moreover, both President Carter and 
Secretary Brown detailed the potential benefits of such reorganization, including the 
simplification of the decision-making process, with clearer accountability for performance, 
reduction of staff size, and the elimination of redundant offices.  
 Among Secretary Brown’s initiatives were reductions in staffs as well as a decrease 
in the overall number of organizations reporting to the SECDEF. Prior to President Carter’s 
request, Secretary Brown had already sent proposed OSD reorganizations to Congress for 
approval. Furthermore, Secretary Brown directed a series of administrative actions to clarify 
existing organizational ambiguities.  
Fourth, the studies focused on better integrating defense policy formulation with the 
development of national priorities. These reviews were the means to develop long-range national 
security plans consistent with national policies and goals. Moreover, such reorganizational 
                                                             
2 Harold Brown, Department of Defense Annual Report: Fiscal Year 1979 (Secretary of Defense Harold Brown, 
Department of Defense Report, February 2, 1978), pg. 348. 
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efforts established the means to create organizations that could effectively address a broad range 
of policy issues that would before have only been given piecemeal attention.  
Comprehensive analysis of each of these four factors provides context to the history 
surrounding the creation of the USD(P) and eventually the Office of the Under Secretary of 
Defense for Policy. These findings are highlighted throughout various DoD-based publications, 
directive memoranda, reports, and a variety of supplemental sources which ultimately supported 
the argument. By carefully dissecting the bureaucratic nature, organizational purposes, and 
structure of the DoD, the justification and reasoning surrounding creation of the OUSD(P) 
becomes clear. 
 
II. Understanding the Structure: 1947-1977 
 
A basic knowledge of its formative years as well as its organizational hierarchy is 
required to successfully navigate the bureaucratic labyrinth of the Department of Defense. The 
DoD was created as a result of a three year debate surrounding the most effective means of 
organizing and managing national defense.3
                                                             
3 Department of Defense Key Officials 1947-2004 (Washington, DC: Historical Office of the Office of the Secretary 
of Defense, 2004), pg. 1. 
 Following World War II, Congress determined to 
place the War and Navy Departments under a single organization, the newly created National 
Military Establishment (NME). Physical consolidation of the departments had taken place 
throughout the war; additionally, the creation of the Joint Chiefs of Staff increasingly centralized 
military command and control. Assuming the oath of office as the first Secretary of Defense in 
September of 1947, James V. Forrestal commanded the newly established National Military 
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Establishment.4 Two years later with the passage of the 1949 Amendments to the National 
Security Act, the NME became the Department of Defense.5
Throughout Secretary Forrestal’s tenure, the NME was comprised of the three military 
departments, the U.S. Army, Navy, and Air Force, in addition to three statutory agencies: the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), the Research and Development Board, and the Munitions Board.
 
6 
Despite this rudimentary organization, Secretary Forrestal still needed to create a structure, 
develop procedures, and organize a staff to assist him in carrying out his responsibilities. 
Emerging from this conglomeration was the Office of the Secretary of Defense, an extension of 
the secretary himself as the civilian authority within the DoD.7 To this end, OSD has undergone 
numerous organizational changes since its 1947 creation. At the time of OSD’s establishment, 
three special assistants comprised the supporting staff to the Secretary of Defense. Ensuing 
organizational assessments determined that the SECDEF needed to be relived of the excessive 
burden of routine administrative tasks.8 In an attempt to resolve this challenge, Congress in 1949 
created four presidentially-appointed, senate-confirmed (PAS) officials: a first assistant Deputy 
Secretary of Defense (DEPSECDEF) and three Assistant Secretaries of Defense (ASDs).9
Considering the almost immediate amendment of the National Security Act, one can infer 
from the formative years the tendency to restructure OSD to make the organization more 
effective and to redefine mission goals and priorities accordingly. Additionally, an emerging 
organizational hierarchy is noticeable with the creation of new DoD positions within the upper-
  
                                                             
4 Ibid. 
5 Ibid. 
6 Trask and Goldberg, The Department of Defense, pg. 11. 
7 Ibid. 
8 Revised Organizational Structure for the Office of the Secretary of Defense (Washington, DC: Prepared by: 
Directorate for Organizational and Management Planning Office of the Director of Administration and 
Management, April 2010), pg. 1. 
9 Ibid. 
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most echelons of OSD. Throughout the 1950s, the supporting staff to the SECDEF and 
DEPSECDEF consisted of the ASDs, the Assistants to the Secretary of Defense (ATSD), and 
other supporting staff officials under the designation of Chairman or Director.10 Essentially, the 
establishment of the ASD and ATSD positions marked the initiation of a new convention in 
which the principal broad portfolio staff assistants to the SECDEF and DEPSECDEF would be 
the Under Secretaries of Defense (USD).11 Their importance would be underscored further at the 
end of the 1970s when ASDs would be assigned under these USDs.12 More interestingly, 
assigning ASDs under USD’s marked the first instance in which a PAS official answered 
through another PAS official, beneath the level of the Secretary.13
As the total number of USDs expanded, each with its own specified defense 
concentration, the concept of the USD’s first assistant emerged, which became the Deputy Under 
Secretary of Defense (DUSD). These PAS first assistants were presumed to be the “alter ego” of 
the USD and were deemed statutorily to act for and exercise the necessary powers of their 
particular USD when he/she would be absent or otherwise unable to complete their prescribed 
tasks.
 From here, one can begin to 
see the expanding nature of OSD and its systematic yet evolving processes.  
14
                                                             
10 Ibid. 
 Over time, these reporting ASDs, DUSDs, and eventual PDUSDs (Principal Deputy 
Under Secretaries of Defense) reflected the DoD’s mission as directed by the national security 
strategy. Moreover, the formation of a policy branch enabled OSD to more effectively create 
policies reflective of the president’s and the National Security Council’s interests.  
11 Ibid. 
12 Ibid. pg. 2. 
13 Ibid.  
14 Ibid. “This provision in U.S. Code would make a DUSD the statutory “first assistant” as it is currently defined 
relative to the Federal Vacancies Reform Act of 1998, as amended (VRA). However, within the Department, by 
policy, a first assistant to a PAS official is both the VRA first assistant and the official’s “alter ego” in terms of 
exercising the USD’s authority, direction, and control [].” 
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There usually was a lag between confirmation and appointment of new DoD officials and 
the DoD directive (DoDD) that authorized their office. The rank of statutory officials within 
OSD was established at the Executive Level, in which their organizational hierarchy was 
grouped in five tiers: Level I including the SECDEF, Level II including the DEPSECDEF, and 
Level III including the USD(P)s.15 Levels IV and V included various PDUSDs, ASDs, Directors, 
the General Counsel, and the Inspector General.16
These various organizational echelons shaped the formation and transformation of the 
DoD, specifically the civilian-led OSD. Many of the resulting organizational functions were the 
consequence of various acts, amendments, and/or organizational reforms. The Sequence of Major 
Events in the Field of Defense Organization from 1947-1978 highlights the core elements that 
shaped the structure of DoD, which included the National Security Act of 1947, the Amendments 
of 1949, Reorganization Plan No. 6 of 1953, the Defense Reorganization Act of 1958, and 
Administrative and Legislative Modifications, 1958-1977.
 The importance of the emerging USD(P) 
position is underscored as seen with its hierarchical placement as a third tier organization within 
OSD.   
17
                                                             
15 Key Officials, pg. iii. [introductory note] 
 These organizational efforts denote 
the changing structural and administrative nature of the DoD, in which change was more or less 
continuous. Therefore, as new reorganization changes were proposed in the late-1970s, the DoD 
did not try to stymie them but acted accordingly as it had in the past. 
16 Ibid. 
17 Memorandum for Mr. S.A. Tucker [OSD Historian]. SUBJECT: Defense Organization; historical summaries, 
written by Jim Wolbarsht, March 29, 1978. This memorandum included four tabs (A,B,C,D) each specifically 
detailing a particular issue pertinent to defense organization. Tab A, “Sequence of Major Events in the Field of 
Defense Organization from 1947-1978. Prepared by Mr. S.A. Tucker, the OSD Historian” produced a nine-page 
summary, explicating detailing I. The National Security Act of 1947, II. The Amendments of 1949, III. 
Reorganization Plan No. 6 of 1953, IV. Defense Reorganization Act of 1958, and V. Administrative And Legislative 
Modifications 1958-1978. This memorandum was in response to Mr. Tucker’s assistance, in which Mr. Wolbarsht 
provided a compilation of use material on defense organization, as requested by Mr. Tucker. OSD Historical Office 
Subject Files. IV. Organization: Under Secretary (Policy) 1977-1994. Box 610.  
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III. President Carter’s Reorganization Project 
 
“The problems of an organization as large and diverse as the Department of Defense 
(DoD) are not unique to government. Often they are characteristic of large organized enterprises 
in general.”18 With this notion in mind, President Jimmy Carter directed a defense reorganization 
memorandum to Secretary of Defense Harold Brown on September 20, 1977. Specifically, 
President Carter requested that Secretary Brown, “… initiate a searching organizational 
review….to produce an unconstrained examination of alternative reforms in organization, 
management, and decision process in the Department of Defense.”19 Such action would 
ultimately coincide with the president’s overarching governmental reorganizational efforts to 
streamline the efficiency and effectiveness of the Executive Departments. Coincidentally, OSD 
and Secretary Brown were already undertaking their own organizational review at the time of 
President Carter’s request, seeking to improve internal coordination. Therefore such a proposal 
was not unfamiliar since it “complemented the reorganization efforts which were already in 
progress within the Department [of Defense].”20
Considering the nature of the DoD, President Carter’s proposal focused on three major 
issues for defense reorganization: (1) Defense Resource Management, (2) the Defense 
Management Structure, and (3) the National Military Command Structure.
  
21
                                                             
18 Brown, Annual Report, pg. 348. 
 In dealing with each 
issue, the president’s proposals sought to expose inefficient organizational functions and produce 
19 White House Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense. SUBJECT: Defense Reorganization. WH [#] 54276, 
written by President of the United States, Jimmy Carter, September 20, 1977., [cover page]. OSD Historical Office 
Subject Files. IV. Organization: Under Secretary (Policy) 1977-1994. Box 610.  
20 Brown, Annual Report, pg. 355. 
21 White House., pg. 1,5,8. 
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a procedural plan to streamline them. Regarding Defense Management Structure, President 
Carter’s reorganization project sought an answer to the query: “How can the top management 
structure of the Department of Defense become more effective and efficient in carrying out the 
national security mission?”22 Citing prior initiatives to improve DoD organization, President 
Carter highlighted that “the major thrusts of these efforts have been toward increased civilian 
control, centralization, and unification.”23
For instance, the Blue Ribbon Defense Panel Report executed a comprehensive review of 
the 1970 management structure of the DoD. This particular panel concluded a host of issues 
remained unanswered including the “overlapping and duplication in staffs as a result of redefined 
roles and responsibilities over time; growth in counterpart and coordination-only activities within 
these staffs; layering of staffs within organizations; and shared responsibility and accountability 
for various activities.”
 Moreover, President Carter’s memorandum addressed 
some of the reoccurring issues surrounding defense management structure.  
24
In order to reorganize the defense management structure, President Carter’s 
memorandum recommended a focus on the roles and responsibilities of the OSD, Office of the 
 Ultimately, changes needed to be made to ensure for a more productive 
DoD in line with overarching security objectives. Previous defense reorganization efforts 
essentially sought to increase civilian control while centralizing and unifying the underlying 
support structure of the OSD staff. Prior to President Carter’s reorganization request, OSD had 
already begun to seek methods to restrain the limits of the SECDEF’s span of control, while 
improving internal coordination mechanisms and reducing the size of the OSD staff. In an 
attempt to perfect the organizational nature of the OSD, President Carter’s request ultimately 
accelerated the execution of these changes.  
                                                             
22 Ibid., pg. 5. 
23 Ibid. 
24 Ibid. 
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Joint Chiefs of Staff (OJCS), service secretaries, and military department staffs.25 The study 
would highlight the core missions of each select management function, while reviewing their 
performance. Specifically addressing the organization of the OSD, the study was concerned as to 
whether the SECDEF could effectively exercise control over both operating forces and defense 
resources.26 Additionally for the OSD, the study sought “to develop and implement long-range 
national security plans consistent with national policies and goals; to evaluate current and new 
defense systems to ensure readiness, adherence to performance standards, and compatibility with 
other programs.”27
President Carter’s memo laid out the potential benefits of a reorganized DoD 
organizational structure. These included: 
 Therefore the study would ensure the integration of defense policies in 
conjunction with national priorities, as seen through the reference of long-range national security 
plans. 
- Reducing redundancy and duplication, minimizing layering, and grouping by 
functions. 
- Simplifying the decision-making process, with clearer accountability for 
performance. 
- Eliminating or reducing some staffs with corresponding reductions in costs.28
With this study, President Carter ultimately sought to alleviate organizational deficiencies with 
the DoD by rooting out redundant, overlapping, and overly centralized structure.  
  
 
                                                             
25 Ibid., pg. 6. 
26 Ibid. 
27 Ibid. 
28 Ibid., pg. 7.  
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IV. OSD Response to President Carter’s Defense Reorganization Project 
 
Following the receipt of President Carter’s memorandum concerning defense 
reorganization, Secretary Brown orchestrated a call to review existing DoD functions in an 
attempt to distill efficient organizations from ones of a more ambiguous nature.  Mirroring 
President Carter’s three issue summaries, Brown directed the initiation of a reorganization study 
focused on three primary areas of inquiry: 
 
- The Defense Department Headquarters Structure – a review of the roles, functions, 
and responsibilities of OSD, the Service Secretariats, and Service Staffs 
- The DoD Organization of Resource Management – a review of DoD resource 
management systems and DoD support activities 
- The National Military Command Structure (NMCS) – a review of the ability of the 
NMCS to respond to the National Command Authorities, and a review of the 
appropriate roles of the Secretary of Defense, Joint Chiefs of Staff, and Unified and 
Component Commanders in the NMCS.29
Moreover, the 1979 Department of Defense Annual Report detailed the suggested outcome(s) of 
the Defense Reorganizational study, which would improve the efficiency and responsiveness of 
DoD by: 
  
- Strengthening management arrangements by identifying and eliminating unnecessary 
overlap, fragmentation, or operating redundancies in major DoD programs, functions, 
and responsibilities. 
                                                             
29 Brown, Annual Report, pg. 355. 
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- Improving the effectiveness of the structure, methods, and procedures used to direct 
and control our operating combat forces. 
- Improving DoD resource management structure and processes.”30
In order to meet these objectives, the DoD highlighted prior defense reorganization 
initiatives. These studies allowed previous efforts to be used as a reference when responding to 
President Carter’s request. A September 27, 1977 Director of Organizational and Management 
Planning (O&MP) memorandum directed to the OSD Historian highlighted past major 
reorganization studies and papers. They included: 
 
1. Eberstadt Report – 1945 
2. Hoover Commission – 1949 (Selected Studies) 
3. Heller Committee Report – 1951 
4. Lovett Letter – 1952 
5. Rockefeller Committee – 1953 
6. Brown Study – 1953 
7. Hoover Commission – 1953-1955 (Selected Studies) 
8. Rockefeller Brothers Report – 1958 
9. Symington Committee Report – 1960 
10. Reorganization of DOD – Philosophy and Counter Philosophy – 1960 
11. Blue Ribbon Defense Panel – 1970 (Overall Report).31
                                                             
30 Ibid., pg. 356. 
  
31 Memorandum for the OSD Historian. SUBJECT: Defense Reorganization Project, written by Arthur H. Ehlers, 
Director [of] Organizational and Management Planning, September 27, 1977., pg [second memorandum page 
detailing major reorganization studies and papers – no immediate connection to the Defense Reorganization Project 
synopsis]. This memorandum appears to have been written in response to the OSD Historian’s listing of prior 
reorganization studies and papers to include a section devoted to the Defense Manpower Commission Report on the 
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The frequency of such reorganization studies and papers suggests that President Carter’s 
request was not an unfamiliar one, given the diverse and changing nature of the DoD. In 1969, 
President Richard Nixon and Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird chartered a Blue Ribbon 
Defense Panel to investigate DoD organization. Resulting from this one-year study was a 237-
page report with 113 proposed recommendations.32 In other words, defense reorganization was 
not a new concept and was continuously envisioned throughout various presidential 
administrations, each seeking to bolster the effectiveness of the DoD in accordance with the 
national security objectives. Following the change in the presidential administration in 1977, a 
new assessment of the DoD indicated the desirability of further rationalizing the assignment of 
functional organizational responsibilities within the OSD while also reducing the span of the 
SECDEF’s control.33
Highlighting structural changes to the DoD throughout the years, the essence of the 
O&MP memorandum clarified various initiatives that had been undertaken to improve defense 
organization and management. Since the passage of the National Security Act of 1947, efforts to 
improve DoD organization included the legislative changes of 1949, 1953, and 1958, executive 
reorganization, and internal DoD realignment actions.
 Explicitly, the O&MP memorandum proceeded to detail the objective of 
the Defense Reorganization study, written in response to President Carter’s request. 
34
                                                                                                                                                                                                    
September 26, 1977 list sent to O&MP. In addition to the “Major Reorganization Studies and Paper” listing as 
prepared by the OSD Historian, a supplemental attachment includes a four-page synopsis of the Defense 
Reorganization Project in addition to two organizational charts for a committee concerning these reviews. The 
Defense Reorganization Project is the focal point of this particular memorandum. OSD Historical Office Subject 
Files. IV. Organization: Under Secretary (Policy) 1977-1994. Box 610.  
 These efforts enhanced the role and 
authority of the SECDEF, streamlined management arrangements within the DoD, improved 
32 Memorandum For All Holders of: Analysis of the Integrating Option OR Draft of Final Report. SUBJECT: 
Revised pages of text, attached, written by Jim Wolbarsht, March 30, 1978., pg. 4. “The attached pages numbered 4-
6 are revisions to the text of Analysis of the Integrating Option, TAB I, and to Draft of Final Report, Chapter 2.” 
This memorandum addresses a clerical change within the text specifically detailing Blue Ribbon Defense Panel. 
OSD Historical Office Subject Files. IV. Organization: Under Secretary (Policy) 1977-1994. Box 610. 
33 Ibid., pg. 5. 
34 Memorandum for the OSD Historian., pg. 1. 
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organizational relationships and structures, and upgraded the capability of the combat forces.35 
Since the Reorganization Act of 1958, adjustments had been largely evolutionary, chiefly 
resulting from SECDEF administrative directives.36
- Unnecessary duplication of major functional assignments among and within DoD 
organizations. 
 Despite this, a number of recurring issues 
persisted:  
- Overmanagement and excessive layering or organizations and functions. 
- Effective management of DoD resources. 
- Fragmentation of major functions and responsibilities among and within DoD 
organizations. 
- Responsiveness of the military command structure. 
- Unnecessary and marginal programs and functions.37
While previous organizational efforts might have revolutionized the means by which the 
DoD functioned, serious organizational ambiguities persisted. Using President Carter’s defense 
reorganization proposal as a formative foundation, the goal of the Defense Reorganization 
Project was to alleviate the aforementioned challenges. Moreover, the identification of these 
persistent issues allowed an opportunity to specifically address the challenges they posed to the 
efficiency and effectiveness of the DoD. With the O&MP memorandum’s notion of change as 
evolutionary in mind, reorganizational proposals would also help to rethink defense structure, 
seeking new and improved means to better it for the present and future. As described within the 
  
                                                             
35 Ibid. 
36 Ibid. 
37 Ibid.  
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confines of this memorandum, the Defense Reorganization Project sought to improve the 
efficiency and responsiveness of the DoD by: 
- Identifying unnecessary overlap, duplication, fragmentation and operating 
redundancies in major DoD functions and responsibilities. 
- Strengthen management arrangements and streamlining organizational relationships, 
including the identification of opportunities for the integration and consolidation of 
functions. 
- Improving the effectiveness of the operating combat forces. 
- Improving DoD resource management processes.38
Having successfully identified the organizational challenges facing the DoD as well as 
prescribing a means to improve them, the Defense Reorganization Project suggested that such an 
undertaking would be under the direction of a Steering Committee, comprised of current and 
former DoD senior officials.
  
39 Knowledgeable individuals, external to the DoD, would 
supplement their efforts. Yet the daily coordination of the project was placed under the 
responsibility of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Administration acting as the 
Executive Secretary to the Steering Committee.40
                                                             
38 Ibid., pg. 3. 
 As mentioned earlier, reorganizational 
proposals within the DoD were not novel. However, dealing with a highly bureaucratic 
organization tended to present challenges in terms of establishing new frameworks of 
management and operation.   
39 Ibid. 
40 Ibid., pg. 3-4. 
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The DoD remained a colossal institution executing a number of diverse and quite often 
overlapping tasks, despite the many efforts to reorganize and restructure it. Some DoD offices 
and agencies had prevailed in intermittently resisting reforms, viewing them as reducing their 
resources and power.41 Nonetheless, change had indeed occurred, most notably in the 
centralization of authority, principally within the OSD.42 Prior to the 1980s, most initiatives 
seeking changes in DoD organizational functions emanated from the president or the secretary of 
defense.43
 
 President Carter’s organizational request essentially bolstered Secretary Brown’s own 
internal reorganization efforts, providing validity for his actions. These twin impulses to review 
existing DoD functions enabled the OSD to propose changes seeking to strengthen and 
streamline its prescribed duties.  
V. SECDEF Harold Brown’s Role 
 
One of the crucial factors shaping this overarching organizational effort was Secretary of 
Defense Harold Brown’s initiatives. On the topic of defense management, Secretary Brown 
stated that, “[w]ith my own desire to increase efficiency and to get the most out of every defense 
dollar, there is a compelling need to streamline organizational relationships and management 
arrangements in the Department of Defense. Accordingly, I have made organizational and 
management reform a matter of priority.”44
                                                             
41 Trask and Goldberg, The Department of Defense, pg. 51.  
 Promptly responding to President Carter’s defense 
reorganization proposal, Secretary Brown ordered a thorough and comprehensive review of the 
existing DoD functions. He further acknowledged the diverse nature of the DoD and his desire 
42 Ibid.  
43 Ibid. 
44 Brown, Annual Report, pg. 348. 
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for such a comprehensive review. “Considering its enormous size and complexity, the 
Department of Defense has been (and, I think, is) a well run organization,” he wrote. “However, 
organizational arrangements and management processes are of necessity dynamic in nature. They 
must be adjusted to respond to changing conditions and new requirements.”45
Given the nature of an organizational review, Secretary Brown argued that “we are not 
interested in reorganization merely for the sake of change. Those alternatives that will best 
improve Defense efficiency and responsiveness will be selected for implementation.”
 
46 This 
comment shows the vision behind the proposed reorganizational effort, indicating that it might in 
fact be an opportunity to further streamline DoD functions. Moreover, Secretary Brown saw 
reorganization as a means to improve the DoD in the long-term, as seen through the many 
administrative and legislative actions pertinent to DoD structure that he initiated. Consequently, 
Secretary Brown’s reorganization efforts were “the most far-reaching since those of former 
Defense Secretary Robert S. McNamara.”47
Specifically addressing reorganizational efforts, Secretary Brown could argue that, “I 
have initiated a number of administrative actions and proposed legislation designed to remedy 
these problems. To date, they have included a major reorganization and staff reduction in the 
Office of the Secretary of Defense, staff reductions and organizational realignments in the 
Headquarters of the Military Departments, and initiation of a Defense Reorganization Study to 
review comprehensively organizational and management arrangements in DoD.”
  
48
                                                             
45 Ibid. 
 Prior to 
President Carter’s reorganizational request, Secretary Brown was spearheading the effort to 
46 Ibid., pg. 356.  
47 Bernard Weinraub, “Defense Chief Creates New Civilian Post in Move to Bolster Policy Role,” The New York 
Times, January 18, 1978, sec. B4. OSD Historical Office Subject Files. IV. Organization: Under Secretary (Policy) 
1977-1994. Box 610. 
48 Brown, Annual Report, pg. 351. 
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tackle DoD organizational challenges through administrative action and legislative proposals. 
His annual report concluded, “[t]he Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) and the 
Headquarters of the Military Departments were too large and engaged in too many activities that 
could be effectively performed at lower levels in the Department [of Defense]…The Secretary's 
span of control was too broad for effective management.”49
A dominant factor shaping the reorganization effort was Secretary Brown’s desire to 
reduce his own span of control. Over a two year period (1977-1978) he accordingly reduced the 
number of major OSD staff offices reporting directly to him from fourteen down to nine.
 Secretary Brown’s compliance and 
willingness to address reorganizational proposals, as sought by both President Carter and OSD- 
produced studies, ensured a more rapid and efficient reorganization.  
50 This 
reorganization relieved the SECDEF of over-excessive burdens while establishing new 
organizations to efficiently distill information before it reached the SECDEF’s desk. Brown 
explained his reasoning thus: “There are ten defense agencies in the Department, whose directors 
typically reported directly to the Secretary. To streamline the Department and to reduce my own 
span of control, I have now placed most of these agencies under the direction of one of the under 
secretaries or assistant secretaries.”51
Secretary Brown’s attention towards OSD reorganization ushered in a new era of DoD 
structuring and development. Emphasis was directed towards consolidating related functions 
while eliminating unnecessary or marginal functions. Consequent actions spurred a transfer of 
functions to lower echelons which were primarily operational in national. This organizational 
 Essentially, Secretary Brown established what he viewed 
as a more efficient and effective means for coordinating plans and firmly re-establishing the 
hierarchical structure within OSD.  
                                                             
49 Ibid., pg. 349. 
50 Ibid., pg. 355. (See Figures I-II, Appendix B, page 36) 
51 Ibid., pg. 352. 
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streamlining was visible through staff reductions. As Secretary Brown highlights, such 
reorganization changes, “…have enabled us [(DoD)] to reduce the manpower authorization for 
the Office of the Secretary of Defense by 546 positions from its January 1977 strength of 2,065, 
a reduction of approximately 26 percent. Of these reductions, 337 have been accomplished by 
transferring personnel and functions to other DoD organizations and 209 positions have been 
abolished outright.”52
Essentially, the reorganization relieved the SECDEF of unnecessary burdens and 
installed operational components within the OSD, which would report to the SECDEF. Secretary 
Brown’s organizational initiatives produced both administrative actions and proposed legislation, 
since congressional action was required to fully implement them.”
 Such reductions are unusual government behavior.  
53
 
 
VI. Legislative Action 
 
As Secretary Brown took steps to reorganize the OSD, he recommended legislative 
action to remedy its deficiencies. Prior to President Carter’s request, Secretary Brown was 
already engaged with proposed legislation to confront these challenges. On April 7, 1977 
Secretary Brown directed letters to the President of the Senate, Walter F. Mondale, the Speaker 
of the House of Representatives, Thomas P. O’Neill, Jr., the Chairman of the Committee of 
Armed Services for the United States Senate, John C. Stennis, and the Chairman of the 
Committee of Armed Services for the United States House of Representatives, Melvin Price. In 
letters addressed to President Mondale and Speaker O’Neill, Secretary Brown stated the reasons 
for a legislative proposal, which were “to amend titles 10 and 5, United States Code, to 
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disestablish one of the positions of Deputy Secretary of Defense and establish an Under 
Secretary of Defense for Policy, and for other purposes.”54
Secretary Brown stated that the proposed legislation would strengthen management by 
reducing the SECDEF’s span of control, by streamlining organizational arrangements, and by 
reducing staffing levels.
 Secretary Brown reiterated this 
statement in his letters directed to Chairman Stennis and Chairman Price. Ultimately, Secretary 
Brown’s proposed legislation called for replacing one senior DoD position with another at a 
slightly lower lever and with more specialized duties. 
55 The proposed legislation would reduce existing functions, which 
appeared too broad for effective management. Secretary Brown noted the current DoD structure 
as having twenty-nine major offices, plus seven Unified/Specified Commands reporting directly 
to the SECDEF and DEPSECDEF.56 Among these offices, thirteen were within OSD.57 
Organizational streamlining efforts would not only reduce staff levels, but create the means to 
distill information before it appeared on the SECDEF’s desk. To bolster his argument, Secretary 
Brown noted that “virtually every group which has reviewed this Department’s organization has 
concluded that this span of control is entirely too broad for management.”58
Secretary Brown’s proposal first called for the elimination of one of the two deputy 
secretaries of defense. The existence of two principal assistants within the OSD created 
confusion concerning the most appropriate official to contact to relay information or from whom 
to seek decisions. The removal of one DEPSECDEF would effectively eliminate any ambiguities 
surrounding the immediate distribution of executive authorities within the upper-most echelons 
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of the OSD, while “clarify[ing] the role of the remaining Deputy Secretary as the singly principle 
assistant and alter ego to the Secretary in all areas of Defense management.”59 Secretary Brown 
explained that the “disestablishment of the second Deputy Secretary of Defense position 
eliminates confusion regarding the distribution of executive authority immediately below the 
Secretary and permits me to use the remaining Deputy as my single principal assistant in all 
areas of Defense management.”60
In addition to the elimination of one of the DEPSECDEF positions, Secretary Brown’s 
legislative proposal recommended the creation of an Under Secretary of Defense for Policy at 
Executive Level III. Essentially, this individual would report directly to the SECDEF and would 
serve as the primary adviser and staff assistant for politico-military affairs including “arms 
limitation negotiations, intelligence analysis and requirements, and the integration of 
departmental plans and policies with overall national security objectives.”
 The restructuring of the organizational hierarchy sought to 
clarify the OSD chain of command.  
61 Given the diverse 
variety of such defense matters, the creation of an undersecretary of defense for policy ultimately 
relieved the SECDEF from excessively burdensome management practices. Moreover, the 
diversity of such issues prescribed within the USD(P)’s reach ensured the systematic integration 
of defense policy in accordance with national priorities. Secretary Brown further explained, 
“[t]his [(USD(P))] consolidates, under a single advisor, all of the closely related international 
military policy functions within the Department, thereby permitting me to receive fully 
coordinated advice and assistance in these important and sensitive areas.”62
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Following the introduction of a USD(P) within OSD, Secretary Brown cited the need for 
the Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs) (ASD(ISA)) to report to the 
USD(P).63 In order mineralize the possibility of overlapping or duplicative functions within the 
newly established organization, Secretary Brown called for the designation of the ASD(ISA) as 
the Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (PDUSD(P)) who would call upon 
support from the ASD’s staff.64 Despite not having an abundant staff of his own, the USD(P) 
would have the ASD(ISA) and his principal deputy.65 The reorganization would not change the 
function of the ASDs, but would simply place the newly created USD(P) in the reporting chain 
between them and the SECDEF.66
Secretary Brown’s calls for a reduction in the span of control are also evident in the 
reduction of the number of persons at Executive Level II from five to four in the DoD 
Secretariat. More importantly, Secretary Brown carefully explained that, “by establishing [the 
USD(P)]  which can tie together several related Defense agencies and offices in the intelligence 
analysis and policy area, it will make possible a reduction in the span of control of the Secretary 
of Defense to proportions which will make the Department much more manageable.”
 This reorganization allowed the SECDEF to focus on broader 
policy issues, resourcing of the DoD, and his role as a member of the National Security Council, 
while placing the day to day integration of politico-military affairs under at the undersecretary 
level. 
67
Explaining the fiscal impact of the reorganization, Secretary Brown detailed its costs 
within his proposed legislation to Congress. Essentially the enactment of the proposal was 
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revenue neutral.68 Moreover, it would help facilitate a reduction of OSD staff size with 
concomitant budget savings for the future.69 In letters directed to Chairman Stennis and 
Chairman Price, Secretary Brown stated, “I believe that this legislation ultimately will make 
possible both significant savings to the taxpayer and improved utilization of this nation’s 
resources which are committed to our defense. It also will assist me in better responding to the 
Committee’s [(on Armed Services)] continuing concern that the Department of Defense be 
effectively and efficiently managed. It has the full endorsement of the President. I hope that it 
will have your support.”70
On April 25, 1977, Chairman of the Committee of Armed Services (House of 
Representatives) Melvin Price sponsored Secretary Brown’s proposal in the House of 
Representatives, becoming H.R.6582, A bill to amend titles 10 and 5, United States Code, to 
disestablish one of the positions of Deputy Secretary of Defense and establish an Under 
Secretary of Defense for Policy.
 Given the approval of the Office of Management and Budget, 
Secretary Brown’s legislative proposal was one of the pivotal steps towards the ushering in of a 
new OSD organizational hierarchy, one more streamlined and with a more clearly defined 
hierarchy. 
71 Likewise, the Senate Chairman of the Committee of Armed 
Services sponsored Secretary Brown’s proposal, becoming S.1372, sharing the same title.72 
Detailing the statutory nature of the creation of the USD(P), the bill mandated the USD(P) would 
be appointed by the president and confirmed by the Senate.73
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organizational hierarchy for the upper-most echelons of the DoD. Specifically, “The Under 
Secretary of Defense for Policy takes precedence in the Department of Defense immediately 
after the Deputy Secretary and the Secretaries of the military departments.”74
Following deliberation in executive session, the Senate Committee on Armed Services 
ultimately reported S.1372 favorable, with a technical amendment on May 27, 1977.
 Sixth in the line of 
succession for the DoD, the USD(P)’s importance could not be overlooked, nor his or her 
bureaucratic throw weight taken lightly.  
75 
Additionally, the Investigations Subcommittee of the House Committee on Armed Services 
hosted an open hearing session of H.R.6582 on May 23, subsequently drafting a revised bill that 
ultimately modified the format and organization of H.R. 6582, but not its substance.76 The 
Investigations Subcommittee later approved this revision on July 12, 1977, which was introduced 
the same day as H.R.8247.77 With this momentum in place, the full committee considered 
H.R.8247 on July 18, 1977, suggesting that the text could be substituted for S.1372 as approved 
by the Senate, and reported to the House of Representatives on July 21, 1977.78 The House of 
Representatives approved the substitute language for S.1372 on September 19 and the Senate 
ultimately agreed with the House amendments on October 6, 1977.79
 
 The effort to create the 
position of USD had succeeded. 
VII. Emerging Formative Structure 
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President Jimmy Carter signed the bill as Public Law 95-140 (91 Stat. 1172) on October 
21, 1977.80 Resulting actions included the creation of an Under Secretary of Defense for Policy 
and and Under Secretary of Defense for Research & Engineering, while also eliminating one of 
the DEPSECDEF positions.81 With its establishment, the USD(P) would be able to provide day-
to-day, coherent attention addressing a broad range of issues that would have normally been only 
given piecemeal attention in the past due to the SECDEF’s overly broad span of control.82
Following the creation of the USD(P) position, an Office of the Under Secretary of 
Defense for Policy, or OUSD(P), emerged with the appointments of organizations under the 
jurisdiction of the USD(P). On October 28, 1977, Deputy Secretary of Defense Charles Duncan 
issued a memorandum that designated the ASD(ISA) as the Principal Deputy Under Secretary of 
Defense (PDUSD(P)).
 
Moreover, the legislation eliminated confusion surrounding the effective distribution of authority 
immediately beneath the SECDEF level. This is especially true for the remaining DEPSECDEF, 
whose roles were further clarified. 
83
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authority, and control of the USD(P).84 Those offices now reporting to the USD(P) included not 
just ISA but also the Defense Civil Preparedness Agency and the Director of Net Assessment.85
Henry Owens was slated as the first USD(P). Owens had previously served as the 
director of foreign policy studies at the Bookings Institution and worked with the National 
Security Council prior to Secretary Brown’s offer.
  
86 Despite his stellar qualifications, Owens 
ultimately turned the offer down in January 1978, partly because he had felt that the authorities 
of the office were too vague.87 Following this rebuff, Secretary Brown offered the position to 
Stanley Resor, who had served as the Secretary of the Army from 1965-1971. On July 12, 1978, 
President Carter announced the nomination of Stanley Resor to serve as USD(P).88 This made 
Resor the fourth DoD PAS official under President Carter’s Administration. Resor would serve 
from August 14, 1978 to April 1, 1979, a relatively brief tenure. He was followed by USD(P) 
Robert Komer, who served from October 24, 1979 to January 20, 1981. One of Komer’s earlier 
projects included the development of a pacification program aimed at winning “hearts and 
minds” throughout South Vietnam, known as Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development 
Support (CORDS).89
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Despite the creation of the USD(P), Secretary Brown continued to deal, either on paper 
directly, with ASDs and other officials who chose not report to the two USDs.90 Subordinates of 
the USDs would occasionally bypass their immediate superiors and instead go directly to the 
SECDEF.91 Komer explained this problem in a memorandum directed to his successor. “I found, 
for example, that the ASD(ISA) and DUSD(PR) [(Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Policy 
Review))] were used to dealing directly with the front office and extremely reluctant to go 
through the USD[P],” Komer wrote.92 While Secretary Brown’s reorganization efforts might 
have restructured the upper-most echelons of DoD, there were those who were still hesitant to 
abide by the new power structure. Komer explained, “in the [SECDEF] Brown years, far too 
much then went to [the SECDEF] for approval. USD[P] must, in my view, relieve the 
SecDef/DepSecDef of more of this burden, and must be the top decision-maker on all major 
issues within his purview.”93
Komer further detailed the legacy of his position and the future of USD(P). “…I regard 
the creation of a USD[P] as by now a proven organizational change. On the basis of two years’ 
experience, the innovation has proven its value. SecDef/DepSecDef really need a senior policy 
man to pull together for them all the multiple policy/strategy/politico-military/intelligence 
strands.”
 Nonetheless, Secretary Brown’s efforts seem to have struck a fine 
balance among the ranks within OSD.  
94
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“ISA couldn’t do this [(aforementioned actions)] because it was swamped with urgent and 
important day-to-day political matters including [Department of] State/[…]/DOD interface and 
crucial dealings with Allies. Moreover, an ASD on the same level as several others simply 
lacked the bureaucratic clout to bring other baronies into line.”95 Komer concluded that the 
separate policy/strategic planning shop (in the form of the USD(P)) enabled for a greater focus 
on previously neglected functions.96
 
 He justified the position on the grounds that it relieved the 
SECDEF of a cumbersome informational load, while serving as the principal adviser for the 
SECDEF on a variety of issues that would have otherwise been given minimal attention.  
VIII. Assigned Responsibilities, Functions, and Authorities of USD(P) 
 
Following the creation of the USD(P), the DoD issued DoD Directive (DoDD) 5111.1 on 
October 27, 1978, in which the USD(P)’s role was formally encapsulated.97
1.  Serve as the principal adviser and assistant to the Secretary of Defense for all matters 
concerned with the integration of Departmental plans and policies with overall national 
security objectives. 
 The USD(P)’s roles 
and responsibilities were to: 
2. Exercise direction, authority, and control over the [ASD(ISA)] (who, in addition to 
performing the duties assigned by DoD Directive 5132.2, shall also serve as the Principal 
Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy) and of such additional Deputy Under 
Secretaries as the Secretary of Defense may from time to time appoint 
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3. Exercise direction, authority, and control over the Director of Net Assessment 
4. Exercise direction, authority, and control over the Director of the Defense Civil 
Preparedness Agency 
5. Exercise direction, authority, and control, through the [ASD(ISA)], over the Director of 
the Defense Security Assistance Agency 
6. Exercise direction, authority, and control over the Deputy Under Secretary for Policy 
Review in respect to such responsibilities as may be assigned later, including 
responsibilities for communications, command, control and intelligence policy and space 
activities 
7. Represent [DoD] as directed in matters involving the National Security Council, the DoS, 
Intelligence Community, and other departments and agencies and interagency groups 
with responsibilities in the national security area 
8. Oversee and, as appropriate, develop [DoD] policy with respect to nuclear weapon and 
over nuclear-related matters, providing policy guidance, oversight, and coordination 
9. Oversee [DoD] participation in policy review and control of sensitive intelligence 
matters, including arrangements with foreign governments and matters related to the 
National Security Council and its subcommittees on intelligence 
10. Review evaluations and make recommendations to the Secretary of Defense concerning 
plans and requirements for and capabilities of existing or proposed U.S. or foreign forces 
and their deployments with particular attention to their relation to performance of 
missions which are or may be dictated by the U.S. national security policy 
11. Develop [DoD] policy and requirements for use of outer space and matters related to 
assigned areas of responsibility 
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12. Provide policy guidance for the [DIA] and other Defense Intelligence activities as 
directed by the Secretary of Defense 
13. Serve on boards, committees, and other groups pertaining to the aforementioned areas of 
responsibility 
14. Perform such other functions and duties as the Secretary of Defense may from time to 
time prescribe.98
The first, seventh, ninth, and tenth roles and responsibilities focused on the integration of 
defense policy with national priorities. This solidifies the essence of the USD(P) as the primary 
staff element charged with the development of long-range national security goals within DoD. 
Such attention and detail afforded by the creation of the USD(P) ensured for a more 
comprehensive analysis on a variety of issues ranging from nuclear weapons to net assessment. 
Additionally, DoDD 5111.1 detailed the relationship of USD(P) in accordance with existing 
DoD functions: 
 
1.  In the performance of assigned duties, the Under Secretary for Policy shall: 
a. Coordinate and exchange information with other DoD organizations having 
collateral or related functions. 
b. Use existing facilities and services, whenever practicable, to achieve maximum 
efficiency and economy. 
2. All DoD organizations shall coordinate all matters concerning the functions cited in 
Section B. with the Under Secretary for Policy.99
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Also emerging from DoDD 5111.1 were the organization and management arrangements 
assigned to the USD(P), which stated that the USD(P) “may be assisted by such Deputy 
Secretaries as the Secretary of Defense may from time to time appoint and by such other staff 
assistants as my be authorized.”100 This highlighted the possibility and probability for the 
expansion for OUSD(P), in which additional DoD organizations could be attached to the USD(P) 
in order to carry out its objectives. The majority of the defense agencies that had usually reported 
to the SECDEF now came under the direction of one of the USDs or ASDs. 101
 
 Emerging issues 
would ultimately reshape OUSD(P) and expand its roles and responsibilities so as to adequately 
meet the challenges of the changing world. 
IX. Conclusion 
 
The establishment of the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy was a 
significant milestone in the bureaucratic history of the Office of the Secretary of Defense. 
Among the most significant factors which contributed towards its 1977 inception were President 
Jimmy Carter’s governmental Reorganization Project for the Executive Departments coupled 
with concurrent OSD reorganizational efforts; additional steps taken to reduce the Secretary of 
Defense’s span of control; the elimination of redundant, overlapping, and or unnecessary 
authorities; and the integration defense policy with national priorities. 
While these factors are paramount to the examination of defense reorganization under 
Secretary Brown’s tenure, the defense reorganization effort did not end there. The total number 
of USD’s expanded throughout the mid-1980s’ to the mid-1990’s, as seen through the 
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establishment of a USD for Acquisition in 1986,  a USD for Personnel and Readiness in 1993, 
and a USD for the role of Comptroller in 1995.102
Similar to the emerging 1977 structure, current OUSD(P) organization includes the 
placement of various ASD’s under the USD(P)’s guidance. As of October 1, 2012, the OUSD(P) 
structure includes the USD(P), the PDUSD(P), and two intermediates between the ASDs in the 
forms of the Chief of Staff and the Chief Operating Manger.
 The importance of the USD position continued 
to expand throughout the changing DoD structure as its full potential was realized. Specifically, 
the OUSD(P) structure has continued to evolve, with its organizational roles and responsibilities 
adjusted accordingly.  
103
The analysis of the factors that contributed towards the creation of the OUSD(P) is 
important as it highlights a case study of the evolution of one of many organizations comprising 
the OSD. Extrapolating various DoD-based publications, directive memoranda, reports, and a 
variety of supplemental sources, the bureaucratic processes in play within the DoD become 
clearer. This history matters, as it is a means to thoroughly comprehend organizational evolution 
for the benefit of projected changes within a governmental entity such as the DoD. More 
importantly, referencing previous reorganizational attempts presents insight into various other 
proposals aimed at reshaping DoD management. The foregoing analysis of the creation of the 
OUSD(P) confers historical insight on the roots of a vast organization which remains a critical 
component of the OSD and provides context for contemporary reorganizational proposals.  
 Therefore, Secretary Brown’s 
direct placement of the ASD(ISA) under the USD(P) resonates in contemporary defense 
organization, as seen throughout the current structure. Suffice it say, the OUSD(P) marked the 
introduction of an important new organization within the DoD, which has expanded with time. 
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X. Appendix A: Acronyms  
 
 
ASD – Assistant Secretary of Defense 
ASD(ISA) – Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs 
ATSD – Assistant to the Secretary of Defense 
CORDS – Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support 
DASD – Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense 
DEPSECDEF – Deputy Secretary of Defense  
DoD – Department of Defense 
DoDD – Department of Defense Directive 
DUSD – Deputy Under Secretary of Defense 
FY – Fiscal Year 
H.R. – House of Representatives (for a Bill) 
JCS – Joint Chiefs of Staff 
NME – National Military Establishment 
O&MP – Organizational and Management Planning 
OSD – Office of the Secretary of Defense 
OUSD(P) – Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy 
PAS – Presidentially Appointed, Senate Confirmed 
PL – Public Law 
PDUSD – Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense 
PDUSD(P) – Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy 
S. –  Senate (for a Bill) 
SECDEF- Secretary of Defense  
USD – Under Secretary of Defense 
USD(P) – Under Secretary of Defense for Policy 
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XI. Appendix B: OSD Organizational Charts 
 
Figure I. Office of the Secretary of Defense As of January 31, 1977.104
 
  
 
Figure II. Office of the Secretary of Defense: Current [as of February 2, 1978].105
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Figure III. Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy as of October 1 2012.106
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